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I. THE IMPORTANCE AND FRAGILITY OF TRUST
Lawyers do not have much of a reputation for fostering trust. We insist
that ordinary people get everything down on paper, thereby sowing seeds
of discord and suspicion; we then figure out ways to weasel out of what
look like clear directives, thriving on the very discord we have sown. Per-
haps there is some significance in the fact that although the word "trust"
figures prominently in some standard legal specialties, one of them is
antitrust, a subject in which "trust" can take on sinister connotations.
Nevertheless, even lawyers recognize that trust is a subject of enor-
mous importance in modem world affairs. In fact, we like to think that
law has a role in creating the preconditions for trust in a more general
sense. Like everyone else, we have watched for decades as the residents
of Israel and Northern Ireland have torn one another apart, to some
degree vindicating lawyers' fond view that trust depends on staying
within the ambit of law. Of course, in the last year, it has been humbling
to see these same feuding parties take astonishing steps toward coopera-
tion-slow, difficult, tentative, and dangerous steps-with little or no
help from the law. This should make people in the legal profession ask:
What has allowed these erstwhile enemies to reach out to each other?
How stable is their trusting behavior, and what might undermine the very
fragile trust that makes these steps possible? What might turn their lands
into battlegrounds again, where trust and cooperation are seemingly
beyond the grasp of human actors?
These efforts have vast international significance, but even in the most
ordinary and everyday events, trust is just as essential and just as fragile.
Trust is essential because some trusting first move underlies even the sim-
plest of commercial transactions.' Even a rudimentary barter trade
* Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization, Yale Law School.
1 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND
ECONOMIC THEORY 13, 24 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (affirming the importance of
truthfulness and trust for commercial transactions); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading,
Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More Impor-
tantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 311-13 (1992) (explaining why trust is essential
in exchange); see also Partha Dasgupta, Trust as a Commodity, in TRUST: MAKING
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depends to some degree on trust; that is, each party's trust that when the
goods are on the table, the other party will not grab everything and run.
But why is trust fragile in these basic commercial activities? The prob-
lem is that even the simplest trade has some element of the notorious
"Prisoners' Dilemma," in which "defection" is the dominant strategy of
each player, even though cooperation would yield the most benefit for all
of them as a collectivity.2 This means that when two rational actors-
those who seek to maximize individual benefit-engage in a trade trans-
action, the first actor believes he will be worse off if he trusts the second
actor than if he just grabs and runs, because that is precisely what he
expects the second actor to do.
To be sure, some scholars, notably Robert Axelrod, have concocted
elaborate computerized playoffs to test strategies that might overcome
the dreaded Prisoners' Dilemma. The tough but cooperative strategy of
"tit-for-tat" dominated other strategies in Axelrod's simulated games,3
suggesting that perhaps cooperation can prosper after all. To make tit-
for-tat work, though, there is a catch: The players must begin with an
unexplained and trusting "nice" move." If they do not, tit-for-tat gets
nowhere. Even if some players would like to make such a move, other
scholars suggest that it might not be such a good idea after all. For exam-
ple Jack Hirshleifer and Juan Carlos Martinez Coil worked out simula-
tions of one-shot "elimination" games'-where winners take all and
AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 49, 64 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1985) [here-
inafter TRUST] (describing trust as a "public good").
2 See Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation
Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. LAW & ECON. 1, 17 (1982) (presenting the model of
the "Prisoners' Dilemma").
3 ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-54 (1984). A
player using a tit-for-tat strategy emulates the just-played move of the other,
rewarding cooperation with a reciprocal cooperative move but punishing defection
with reciprocal defection. Id. at 31.
4 Id. at 31. For an earlier exploration of the importance of the first "nice" move,
see Robert L. Swinth, The Establishment of the Trust Relationship, 11 J. CONFLIcr
RES. 335, 343 (1967) (asserting that the establishment of trust between two interde-
pendent people can be accomplished in two steps: the first player exposes herself to
risk, and the second player declines to take advantage of that exposure, foregoing
personal gain).
5 Jack Hirshleifer & Juan Carlos Martinez Coil, What Strategies Can Support the
Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?, 32 J. CONFLIcr RES. 367 (1988) (outlining
and reporting results of computer-simulated elimination tournaments pitting three
strategies against each other: (1) COOPERATE; (2) DEFECT; and (3) either TIT-
FOR-TAT, BULLY, or PUNISHER). Hirschleifer and Martinez Coil's article also
describes a number of complexities that make tit-for-tat a considerably less robust
strategy than Axelrod advocates. See id. at 395 (disputing the effectiveness of a tit-
for-tat strategy in contexts other those meeting Axelrod's precise specifications).
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losers drop out-in which defectors quickly extirpated cooperators.6
Even the nice-but-tough tit-for-tat players, who open with a cooperative
first move, fared poorly in elimination tournaments as opposed to repeat-
play tournaments; unless they could somehow "recognize" defectors in
advance and avoid them, tit-for-tat players were quickly wiped out.7 Of
course, unless the entire game is set up in advance for repetition,' we
don't know whether any particular game will emerge as the happy repeat
play that rewards "niceness," or as the disastrous one-shot deal that pun-
ishes it. The prudent move is to assume the worst, not play at all, and not
trust anyone who does.
So why does anyone trust anyone? How do trust and cooperation get
started? Some legal scholars like to think that law makes trust possible,9
but that is not really a complete answer, because it begs the question of
how people cooperate to establish law. 10
As a practical matter, of course, these are all just musings, because a
great deal of trust and cooperation occurs in the world, with or without or
the background of legal compulsion. In real life, people seek explana-
tions or justifications not for trustworthiness, but for defections from it."
Edna Ullmann-Margalit's important book about cooperation makes the
point that even if we don't know why, we can predict that we will find
norms of cooperation when people need them.'2 If we can find coopera-
6 Id. at 394 (concluding that in elimination tournaments, "cooperators will always
be driven to extinction").
7 Id. at 393-94 (showing that tit-for-tat dominates defectors only when tit-for-tat
recognizes defectors; if recognition requires tit-for-tat to lose a round to a defector,
and loss means elimination, defectors eliminate tit-for-tat).
8 For an exploration of the limited possibilities for cooperation even under condi-
tions of repeat play, see generally Frederick Schick, Cooperation and Contracts, 8
ECON. & PHIL. 209 (1992) (describing the limited circumstances in which rational peo-
ple cooperate in a repeat-play "supergame").
9 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in Long-Term Con-
tracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 583, 584 (1989) (asserting that contract law induces coopera-
tion and beneficial transactions by helping parties overcome mutual suspicion).
10 See Rose, supra note 1, at 314-15 (pointing out that contract law, like exchange
itself, is dependent on an initial gift of organizational effort); see also James E. Krier,
The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J. L. & Pun. POL'Y 325, 334-38
(1992) (discussing, in the context of "free market environmentalism," the question-
begging character of legal and cooperative solutions to the "tragedy of the
commons").
11 See Theodore R. Sarbin, A Criminological Approach to Security Violations, in
CITIZEN ESPIONAGE: STUDIES IN TRUST AND BETRAYAL 107, 118-22 (Theodore
Sarbin et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter CITIZEN ESPIONAGE] (arguing that citizen spies
create elaborate and continually evolving "self-narratives" to justify and explain their
betrayals of trust); cf. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 52-53 (1993) (observing
that because people believe that "justice and sympathy are important," they must
rationalize indifference to suffering to make their actions morally acceptable).
12 EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS 9-11 (1977) (positing
1995]
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tion, then we can also find trust. Unfortunately, as a second practical
matter, need is often not enough either: Potential deals fall apart, court-
ships flounder, joint ventures collapse, and feuds and wars drag on. Trust
is needed to start cooperation over again, but here trust dies on the vine.
Some theorists suggest that there really is no rational explanation for
trust. Jon Elster points out that a thoroughgoing rationalist could not
even understand cooperation, and could not comprehend how anyone
would make a first trusting step out onto the cooperative limb of a deci-
sion tree."3 Robert Frank argues that first moves toward cooperation
really are not rational at all but are grounded in the emotions instead.14
If that is so, then trust must also depend on emotion, or rather, on one
person's assessment of the emotions of another.
All of this leads to three conclusions. First, pure rationality argues
against trust. Second, people trust each other anyway. Third, it is very
important that they do so, because without trust, we could not undertake
any cooperative ventures, from the most trivial to the most cosmic.1 5
If trust is not perfectly rational, then, might it be semi-rational? That
is, are there more or less good grounds for trust, even accepting that pure
rationality generally should make us suspicious?
At this point I need to insert an explanation. What people often con-
sider "real" or "true" trust is a kind of confidence that does not even ask
for good grounds. People usually think of children and pets as trusting in
this intuitively appealing way. If we define trust to mean only this inno-
cent and unquestioning kind of trust, then there is no such thing as
rational trust, or even semi-rational trust, because "real" trust does not
ask for reasons.
that human interactions can generally be classified as Prisoners' Dilemma, Coordina-
tion, or Inequality situations, and asserting that the existence of norms in these situa-
tions may exemplify the presence of an "invisible hand"); see also Robert C.
Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of
Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 45 (1989) ("Cooperative
behavior is often observed in settings where the unalloyed rational-actor model would
be unlikely to predict it.").
13 JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SocIETY 5 (1989) (making this point in the con-
text of a simulated game involving two rational actors); see also Bernard Williams,
Formal Structures and Social Reality, in TRUST, supra note 1, at 3, 6-13 (describing the
fragile formal structure of trusting first moves).
14 ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE
EMOIONS 47-53 (1988) (giving examples of "the commitment problem" and arguing
that people's actions in situations requiring commitment or trust result directly from
feelings and emotions, and only indirectly from rational thought).
15 See Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHIcS 231, 235 -36, 241 (1986) (relat-
ing trust to the need to rely on others because of the basic human inability to be
completely self-sufficient); Russell Hardin, The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust, 21
POL. & Soc'y 505, 507 (1993) (concluding that distrust can lead to greater aggregate
losses than misplaced trust because of lost opportunities for long-term relationships).
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Semi-rational trust, by contrast, is something less than this "real" trust:
It is a trust that asks for assurances and monitoring. This kind of trust is a
doubting or suspicious trust-the trust of Thomas, say, rather than Mat-
thew, Mark, Luke, or John. I suggest that a lot of us are rather more like
Thomas than perhaps we would like to be, but if we waited for complete
faith, we would exclude a lot of behavior that most people actually call
"trusting."'
16
To explore the possibility of semi-rational trust, we must search for the
basis of trustworthiness. When can A reasonably expect that B will coop-
erate and not defect?' 7 To ask the question another way, when can A be
more or less justifiably confident that some factor constrains B's self-serv-
ing behavior?
II. SEMI-RATIONAL TRUST AND THE CONSTRAINTS ON DEFECTION
Robert Ellickson has outlined a useful typology of constraints on self-
interested behavior, labeling those constraints as first-party, second-party
and third-party.'
First-party constraints are those that one puts on one's self.' 9 They are
motivated by such attributes as personal rectitude, honor, loyalty, love,
and the like. Their primary enforcers are sleepless nights, regrets at love
lost, the inability to live with one's self if one abandons a commitment,
and all the visitations of the voice of conscience.
Second-party constraints are, roughly speaking, the "tit-for-tat" consid-
erations elaborated by Robert Axelrod in The Evolution of Coopera-
16 See Charles F. Sabel, Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Co-operation in a
Volatile Economy, in INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGENERATION
215, 217, 224 (Frank Pyke & Werner Sengenberger eds., 1992) (describing one version
of trust as an involuntary state akin to drowsiness or spontaneity, but observing that
people in fact "negotiate" trust and think that trust is compatible with concern about
breach).
17 See Hardin, supra note 15, at 505 (asserting that the potential truster's knowl-
edge is a central element in a rational theory of trust). Hardin also notes that trust
depends not on one's assessment of self-interest, but on one's assessment of the inter-
ests of the person being trusted. Id. In this way, my "semi-rational trust" is similar to
Hardin's "street-level epistemology of trust." Further, Hardin observes that much of
the literature on trust neglects to address the question of trustworthiness, despite the
interconnectedness of the two issues. Id. at 512.
18 Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social
Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 71-72 (1987); see also Jonathan Bendor & Dilip
Mookherjee, Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation, 6 J.L., ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 33, 34 (1990) (suggesting that societal norms may enhance coopera-
tion because they are backed up by first-party, second-party, and third-party con-
straints on behavior); Ellickson, supra note 12, at 46 (opining that "in many contexts
at least, first-party systems of social control are cheaper to administer than third-party
systems are").
19 Ellickson, supra note 18, at 71.
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* 20 Teecntion. These constraints are especially important in what we might
broadly call contractual relations: A is dealing with a partner B who can
retaliate, and A is kept in line by her awareness of B's retaliatory capac-
ity. By parity of reasoning, if B knows that A can retaliate, B too stays in
line.2x
Third-party constraints are those imposed by outsiders who take
enforcement upon themselves,22 even though they are not party to any
relevant transactions and have no direct gains or losses from them. This
kind of restraint punishes bad behavior by shaming, gossip, ostracism,
refusal to deal, and sometimes even physical violence. Third-party con-
straints induce A to behave cooperatively with B because A is concerned
about her reputation with those third parties, or she is nervous that they
may volunteer to punish any defection that she perpetrates on B.
Law also functions as a third-party constraint, albeit a formal one.
Though past jurisprudes have made much of legal constraints as the sin-
ews and bones of social order, Ellickson and others, especially scholars in
what is called the "Law and Society" movement, have argued that formal
law is vastly overrated as a restraint on behavior. 23 These scholars stress
that law has to be understood in the real world-the world studied by
psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists. 24 They think that infor-
mal first-, second-, and third-party constraints may often be far more
important than formal law in constraining would-be defectors.25 I will
come back to this argument later.
Whether formal or informal, though, any of these constraints on defec-
20 AXELROD, supra note 3.
21 See Ellickson, supra note 18, at 71-72 (describing these controls as "rewards and
punishments" administered by the promisee, "depending on whether the promisor
adheres to the promised course of behavior").
22 See id. (listing social forces, organizations, and governments as types of third-
party "controllers").
23 See id. at 67-68 (criticizing the Hobbesian paradigm, in which the legal system is
"the wellspring of social order"); id. at 81-83 (criticizing the "legal centralism" of
modem law-and-economics scholars).
24 See id. at 67 (labeling "empirical sociologists and anthropologists who study
stateless societies" as the "core theorists" of the Law and Society movement); D.J.
Galligan, Introduction, 22 J. LAW & Soc'Y 1, 6-7 (Special Issue: Socio-Legal Studies
in Context: The Oxford Centre Past and Present, 1995) (arguing that law must be
studied "in its social context," and that social sciences, including sociology, anthropol-
ogy, psychology, and others, are essential for that study).
25 See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 Am. Soc. REv. 55, 60-67 (1963) (discussing the widespread sense
among businessmen that formal contract is unnecessary, and offering reasons for and
against the use of contract law in business relations). Macaulay identifies two norms
fueling this disdain for formal contract: the principle that "one does not welsh on a
deal," and the belief that "one ought to produce a good product and stand behind it."
Id. at 63.
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tion should make person A at least somewhat trustworthy. If person B
knows that A is constrained in one way or another, then B's trust in A is
at least semi-rational. The next question, then, is whether people actually
use these constraints as a basis for trust.
The answer is, of course they do. From the perspective of rationality,
or even semi-rationality, the trickiest trust grounds must be the first-party
constraints; that is, the trust that A has in B because B is loyal, upstand-
ing, or loving. A really cannot get inside B's head to experience B's ado-
ration, guilt, or pride. But B clearly thinks that A can be made to trust
him on those grounds, which prompts B to go on at length to assure A of
his personal rectitude or undying loyalty. For her part, A observes these
and other signs of B's character; she tests them, fosters them, and fiddles
with them. Readers may recall, for example, how Mrs. Portnoy tweaked
her son Alex's guilt, just to make the kid reliable."6 People aside from
Mrs. Portnoy are quite obviously aware of first-party constraints, and
they try to assess and manipulate them. I will call this basis of trust
character.
Second-party constraints also give rise to a good deal of trusting behav-
ior, though subject to the objection that perhaps it is not trust, but rather
A's ability to retaliate, that allows A to rely on B. As I mentioned,
though, semi-rational trust is a kind of doubting trust. Insofar as trust is
coextensive with confidence, the possibility of self-help-that is, striking
back when one loses confidence-seems to be a fairly solid ground for
semi-rational trust.
People do search for ways to give and receive second-party reassur-
ances, often by exchanging what Oliver Williamson has called "hos-
tages."27 For example, courts often require criminal defendants to post
bail to assure their reappearance on the date of trial. A home seller will
insist that a potential buyer leave a deposit, to assure the seller that the
buyer is serious during the time allotted to assembling the finances and
making necessary inspections. More generally, A knows that B is much
more likely to trust her with an asset of his, if he can keep one of hers as a
safeguard. In all of these situations, both parties are reassured about the
other's trustworthiness. I will call this trust-ground retaliation.
Third-party constraints also seem to be a reliable ground for confi-
dence, though perhaps less so than retaliatory self-help. Here, A trusts B
not because A can directly retaliate, but because A knows that B cares
about his image or reputation with some group C through Z, whose mem-
bers do not like defectors. If A knows that C through Z will snub a
defecting B, gossip about B, or harass B in some other way that makes
26 PHILIP ROTH, PORTNOY'S COMPLAINT (1969).
27 See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1983) (arguing that "the economic
equivalents of hostages [are] widely used to effect credible commitments" in bilateral
exchanges).
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him suffer, then A can trust B to at least some degree. Indeed, A and B
frequently try to bolster mutual trust by giving and receiving these third-
party assurances. Asian and West African immigrants have used this type
of reassurance to undergird the rotating credit associations through which
they often finance their small business ventures. They generally restrict
membership in such borrowing circles to friends, family, and compatriots,
because these connected persons can be made to feel the intense sting of
ostracism should they defect.' To the extent that the law itself is also a
third-party enforcer, people use legal arrangements to shore up trust and
smooth out business relations. For example, auto manufacturers, in order
to entice consumers to buy more cars, might offer warranties that reas-
sure buyers against shoddy products; here, contract law, rather than
repeat play, is the implicit enforcer of the warranty. I will call this trust-
ground punishment, though perhaps the name is unduly sharp.
Naturally, all these trust grounds may be mutually reinforcing, though
they need not be. Take the situation of a Mafioso. As a first-party mat-
ter, he can be trusted for his omertd-his sworn honor-but reinforcing
his omertd is his fear that a betrayed second party may arrange for his car
to blow up, or that members of the more extended criminal group-third
parties-may take it upon themselves to provide him with a pair of con-
crete shoes. All those constraints make the Mafioso an object of trust, or
at least of semi-rational trust, to the members of his organization. The
example also suggests, of course, as does the legal category of antitrust,
that not all forms of trust and cooperation are benevolent. 29 In the case
of the Mafioso, as well as with members of cartels in general, the third-
party constraint of law operates not to reinforce trust, but rather to dis-
rupt it. Other examples of cross-purpose trust grounds abound, particu-
larly in literature: Romeo and Juliet might trust each other on the basis of
their mutual assurances of love as well as their shared plight, but the
third-party constraints of community norms work against that trust, even
if unsuccessfully.
In sum, the major factors behind semi-rational trust are character, retal-
28 See IVAN LIGHT, ETHNIC ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA: BUSINESS AND WELFARE
AMONG CHINESE, JAPANESE, AND BLACKS 22-35 (1972) (describing rotating credit
associations among Asian and West African immigrants to the United States); id. at
58-60 (observing that Asian credit associations rely on the "informal and moralistic
social relations" of their members as security against the risks inherent in lending);
JANET TAI LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY 102-07 (1994) (discussing trad-
ing within an "ethnically homogenous middleman group" as a response to contract
uncertainty). Berry Gordy, the founder of Motown Records, started his business with
a loan from his family's revolving credit fund. See BERRY GORDY, To BE LOVED
104-08 (1994) (describing Berry's difficulties first in finding a source of funds and then
in persuading family members to loan him $800 from their credit fund).
29 See Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST, supra note 1, at 213, 214
(noting the malevolence of some trusting relations).
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iation, and punishment-that is, trust based on first-party, second-party,
and third-party constraints, respectively. These may work with each
other, separately from each other, or against each other.
It is important to stress that all of these trust grounds engage the trust-
ing party in a considerable amount of checking, monitoring, and reassur-
ance. Consider first-party character. All of us have assessed the
emotional state of others: parents, kin, friends, acquaintances, strangers.
We want to know about those first-party constraints of love, loyalty, con-
science, and guilt, and we have some confidence in our ability to discern
them. The very appearance of the other person may help us to monitor
his or her trustworthiness, a point immortalized in The Eagles' line, "You
can't hide your lyin' eyes.""0 Moreover, even if one can hide one's lying
eyes, one's lying body posture may be more difficult to conceal. 1 Other
rules of thumb may also act as guides, though some might be of rather
dubious validity. For example, one study indicates that people seem to
think women as a gender are more trustworthy than men, though they do
not necessarily apply this expectation to particular women or particular
situations.3 2
Next consider retaliation. For a tit-for-tat strategy to work as a ground
for confidence, A has to know what B is doing, and she needs to be sure
that B is not sneaking something unscrupulous past her. Moreover, A
needs to know that B still cares about whatever it is that A would use for
retaliation. Thus second-party constraints also require A to engage in at
least some monitoring of B.
The situation is similar with punishment. For third-party constraints to
be effective, A has to know that B really cares about his status with, say,
his church group, or that B wants to keep out of jail. In addition, A must
be sure that the enforcing third parties will find out about any cheating by
B, and will be sufficiently indignant to punish B.us
Clearly, monitoring and assurance are features of all these semi-
rational trust-grounds. However, the extent to which one party monitors
or demands reassurance from the other will be limited by the cost of
30 THE EAGLES, Lyin' Eyes, on THE EAGLES: THEIR GREATEST HITS (1971-75)
(Elektra/Asylum/Nonesuch Records 1976) ("You can't hide your lyin' eyes, and your
smile is a thin disguise.").
31 See FRANK, supra note 14, at 114-33 (discussing a variety of physical cues,
including facial expression, voice, and body language, in a chapter entitled "Telltale
Clues").
32 See John Orbell et al., Trust, Social Categories, and Individuals: The Case of
Gender 16 (Nov. 1994) (drawing such a conclusion from experiments involving Pris-
oners' Dilemma games) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Boston University Law
Review).
33 James S. Coleman notes that trust based on third-party punishment may be
weakened by a public-goods problem, because each potential punisher may prefer to
leave the task to others. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 115-
16 (1990).
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those endeavors. One could hypothesize that the heaviest monitoring
and reassurance occurs at the beginning of a trusting relationship, when
A's confidence in B is shaky. Further along in the relationship, semi-
rational people are likely to ease off and neglect some of the continued
double-checking that truly rational actors might prefer. Indeed, perhaps
they should ease off; policing and monitoring consume time and effort,
which could eliminate all the gains from cooperative ventures.
Perhaps as a kind of adaptive response, people do not like to be moni-
tored. They may well mistake monitoring and questioning for distrust or
hatred, and in so doing, communicate to the other party that she should
take things more lightly. Harold Garfinkel performed some interesting
experiments in this regard, in which students were made to question or
express distrust of the assertions of their friends and families. The friends
and families took this extremely badly. "Are you sick?" they said, at first
quizzically, and then angrily. They took it so badly, in fact, that the stu-
dents had a great deal of trouble keeping up their assigned ruses.34
The lesson to be learned here is that constant monitoring and checking
can poison the atmosphere. These activities have the appearance of a slur
on the character of the monitored party. Indeed, the monitored party,
feeling distrusted, may actually behave worse. By contrast, unquestion-
ing trust has a very appealing quality to which people seem to respond
well. This is demonstrated by pet therapy programs in a great variety of
institutional settings: The animals give affection and trust unreservedly,
and can stimulate emotional expression, brighten moods, and encourage
more sociable behavior in the recipients.3 5 Jon Elster attributes the first
trusting step in a cooperative relation to something that he labels "magi-
cal thinking": A believes that B will behave in the same way that A does,
and will therefore emulate A's trusting and cooperative moves.3 6 Oddly
enough, this magic very often seems to work.37 Suspicious behavior, on
14 See BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST 11-14 (1983) (sum-
marizing Garfinkel's experiments and concluding therefrom that "[tlhe absence of
trust in the moral social order is very difficult to accept or to perpetrate").
35 See, e.g., Helen de Bertodano, Prison Pets Help to Tame the Wildness of Con-
victs, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 10, 1993, at 10 (reporting defused tensions
and increased expressions of emotion among British convicts allowed to care for pets
while in prison); Jacqueline Heard, Pet Therapy Gains Popularity, CHI. TRni., Oct. 25,
1987, § 18,'at 14 (describing the benefits of animal-assisted therapy programs for such
diverse groups as hospital patients, abused or autistic children, the elderly, psychiatric
patients, and prisoners).
36 See ELSTER, supra note 13, at 195-201 (elaborating such thinking as the belief
that "my cooperation can cause others to cooperate" and expressing surprise that
some researchers think this belief is rational).
37 See Swinth, supra note 4, at 337 (concluding from experiments that many more
people are willing to respond to a cooperative move initiated by the other party than
are willing to make the initial move themselves); see also Peter Kollock, The Emer-
gence of Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of Uncertainty, Commitment,
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the other hand, may itself foster uncooperativeness.38
Monitoring is costly, then, both because it imposes direct burdens on
the monitor and because it may engender a countersuspicion in the moni-
tored party. For those reasons, there may be a kind of entropy of semi-
rational trust over time. First, all the other trust grounds may dissolve
into a trust in the other party's character-that is, trust based on first-
party constraints, which are of course particularly difficult to monitor.
Then, if things go well, monitoring may cease altogether. The entropy
pattern is this: A gradually stops watching B and threatening B with some
nasty consequence of defecting; then A starts to rely on B's upright char-
acter; and finally A just stops thinking about B's trustworthiness. This
may be one reason why unguarded trust appears to be fairly common. In
a way, this slide from semi-rational trust to unguarded trust is a kind of
moral equivalent of the human belief in causality; as Hume observed, we
have a propensity to believe that the future will be like the past. 9
Of course, the future sometimes is not like the past, and trusted parties
do betray the trusting ones. Naturally, lawyers are interested in that pat-
tern. In fact, the law offers an unparalleled window on betrayals, an end-
lessly fascinating aspect of trust.
III. BETRAYALS: HOLDING THE MIRROR TO TRUST
The law's portraits of betrayals are sometimes oddly skewed, as parties
try to fit their situations into various legal categories, or alternatively,
escape from them. Still, it is hard to find a more fulsome repository of
betrayal than law. It is an important repository, too, because betrayals
cast a special light on trusting behavior. Betrayers have to induce trust by
simulating reassuring appearances in a convincing way, or by inducing the
victims to dispense with reassurances altogether. Either way, betrayers
tell us a good deal about how and why people trust other people, even if
mistakenly. It is in this sense that betrayals hold up a mirror to trust.
This Part takes up some quite egregious examples of betrayals of trust.
Each example involves betrayal of a different type of trust-trust based
on first-party constraints, second-party constraints, and third-party con-
and Trust, 100 AM. J. Soc. 313, 337-38 (1994) (observing that in simulated trade rela-
tions, subjects who had been able to establish trust in trade developed very positive
feelings toward one another).
38 For a demonstration of a slightly different connection between suspiciousness
and untrustworthiness, see FRANK, supra note 14, at 142-43 (describing a cooperation
experiment in which subjects who predicted that a partner would cooperate tended to
cooperate themselves, but subjects who predicted defection were themselves likely to
defect).
39 DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 51-53, 56
(Charles W. Hendel ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1955) (1748) (arguing that the
human belief in causality rests on the notion that the future will be like the past, and
that this belief rests on custom rather than reason).
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straints, in that order. For each type of betrayal, I have chosen what I
hope is an exemplary crime.
A. Bigamy: The Betrayal of Intimate Trust
Infidelity, especially in its criminal form as bigamy, involves a betrayal
of trust among intimates. I put to one side here consensual polygamy as
it exists in some religious sects and traditional societies. What I mean is
the bigamy in which one party consciously marries two or more spouses,
and none of these spouses knows a thing about the other or others.
I think it is fair to say that, in general, the primary guarantor of marital
fidelity is the first-party constraint of character, especially in the forms of
love and loyalty. Partners look to each others' character for reassurances.
B is crazy about A and wouldn't cheat on A for the world. What's more,
if he does, A will make him feel like the guilty dog he is, thus reinforcing
his first-party constraints. Second-party constraints add to the first-party
ones: B knows that if he cheats, A can cheat back or get back at him some
other way, such as by using his new car for target practice, or picking
fights about a lot of unrelated matters when B knows full well what the
real issue is. There are likely to be third-party constraints as well: B will
face the disapprobation of the family, the kids, the neighbors, and the
church parish. On the whole, though, the primary ground of trust in mar-
riage is likely to be character, and when one spouse gets betrayed, he or
she has made a mistake about the other's character.
The law does make these betrayals less attractive, but the legal
response is calibrated to the seriousness of the offense. Modem sociobi-
ologists suggest that infidelity has rather different impacts on male and
female reproductive strategies,4' and indeed, older law seemed to reflect
some of that attitude, though no doubt for reasons other than sociobi-
ology.4 However, I want to focus on a different legal distinction, and a
40 MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR 294 (2d
ed. 1983) (observing that sociobiologists would predict men and women to have dif-
ferent types of sexual jealousy because infidelity's threat to men is impregnation of
the wife by another, whereas the threat to women is the diversion of resources from
the family); see also id. at 293 (stating that although American law gives both men and
women the right to a divorce if the spouse commits adultery, data suggest that men
appear more inclined to actually exercise that right).
41 See, e.g., State v. Holland, 145 S.W. 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912). In this case, the
defendant-a married man-argued that he could not be charged with adultery
unless he cohabited with a married woman. Id. at 522-23. This argument was based
on the common-law notion that the crime was the adulteration of the "pure blood" of
a family, which was possible only through the woman; thus, the defendant argued, the
female participant had to be a married woman for him to be guilty of adultery. Id. at
523. The court rejected this theory after an interesting discussion of its history in
Roman and ecclesiastical law, and made clear that both parties would be guilty of
adultery if either were married. Id.
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quite interesting one, between adultery and bigamy.
Adultery was not a crime at English common law, but it was later
criminalized in much of this country.' " Indeed, some colonial New Eng-
land jurisdictions took adultery quite seriously.' On the whole, though,
where adultery is still a criminal offense, it is generally a fairly trivial
one." The legal issues around adultery are more likely to be civil mat-
ters; for example, adultery has long been a ground for divorce,45 but then,
plenty of other things can also be grounds for divorce. However painful
the subject may be for the parties, the law's current view of adultery is
close to "You like tomato and I like tomahto,. . . let's call the whole thing
off."
46
Bigamy, on the other hand, is considerably more than a civil matter
between the partners. Bigamy may be defined as a serious crime, indeed
as a felony, even in places that have not criminalized simple adultery.47
Why should the law take bigamy so much more seriously? One answer is
that the consequences to the betrayed may be more severe. The stigma
of illegitimacy is visited upon the new children, though that is true of
42 See id. at 523 (asserting that adultery was criminalized in America as a moral
offense rather than as a common-law crime).
43 See EDMUND MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY 41 (1944) (noting that adultery
was a capital crime in 17th-century Massachusetts and Connecticut, but was generally
punished more lightly with fines, whippings, the forced wearing of the letter "A", and
mock versions of hanging).
44 Some states have repealed criminal penalties for adultery. E.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 269a (West 1988) (repealed 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-81 (West
1994) (repealed 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 201 (1994) (repealed 1981). Other
states treat adultery as merely a misdemeanor. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19
(1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (1988); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255-17 (McKinney
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (1995); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3 (1992); see
also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 4 (1992) (requiring that any person convicted of adul-
tery be fined $10); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (1985) (making adultery a misde-
meanor but providing for prosecution only upon complaint of the offended spouse).
However, adultery still officially carries the potential for incarceration in some states.
See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272 § 14 (1993) (providing for a penalty of up to three years in
state prison); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op 1985) (providing for potential
imprisonment for up to one year).
46 Under Connecticut law, for example, adultery is no longer a crime, see supra
note 44, though it may be a ground for divorce. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-
40(c)(3) (West 1986) (allowing for dissolution of marriage, or legal separation, upon a
finding that adultery has occurred).
46 IRA GERSHWIN & GEORGE GERSHWIN, Let's Call the Whole Thing Off, on
SHALL WE DANCE? (RKO 1937).
47 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 283 (West 1988) (making bigamy punishable by a
fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-190 (West 1994) (making bigamy a felony); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 206
(1974) (providing that bigamy is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years).
Note that adultery is not a crime in any of these states. See supra note 44.
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children of adulterous relationships as well, and in any event is probably
less important now than it once was. More importantly, the new spouse's
and children's claims on the bigamist's assets may be limited if the biga-
mist has prior marital and family obligations of which the new spouse was
never made aware.
There is an odd analogy to this situation in mortgage law. Like the
adulterer whose behavior may precipitate a civil action for divorce and
attendant property settlement, the defaulting mortgagor is treated merely
as one who breaches a contract, and is subject only to the civil remedies
of foreclosure and damages. On the other hand, the person who conceals
a prior mortgage from a later lender or buyer is treated as the perpetrator
of a criminal fraud,' as is the bigamist who conceals prior marital com-
mitments. Aside from the consequences to the betrayed, the nub of the
difference may be the fraudulent party's lying at the outset,49 both with
respect to prior marriages and prior mortgages. Adultery, like failing to
48 See, e.g., State v. Haas, 675 P.2d 673 (Ariz. 1984) (upholding the conviction of a
purchaser whose offer suggested a first mortgage retained by the seller, but who actu-
ally granted either sham security interests or mortgages on already heavily encum-
bered property); State v. Mills, 396 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1964) (upholding the conviction of a
borrower who ostensibly granted the lender security through first mortgages on cer-
tain properties, but who actually granted second mortgages on different and previ-
ously encumbered properties); In re People v. Jory, 505 N.W.2d 228, 233-34 (Mich.
1993) (affirming that one may commit the crime of obtaining money by false pre-
tenses by either making affirmative misrepresentations or maintaining silence regard-
ing prior encumbrances on property).
Major security interests in real estate are generally recorded, which means that
property purchasers can discover prior encumbrances by examining public records.
Nevertheless, courts have long held that the availability of this information does not
preclude the criminal conviction of those who affirmatively misrepresent that the
property for sale is free of prior encumbrances. Jory, 505 N.W.2d at 235 n.10 (agree-
ing with this principle and listing supporting cases, some nearly 100 years old, from
diverse jurisdictions); see also Smith v. State, 98 So. 586, 587-88 (Fla. 1923) (discussing
mixed case law on the issue, but siding with the majority of jurisdictions in upholding
conviction); cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3(4) (1962) (defining "theft by deception"
to include "purposely obtain[ing] the property of another by... failing to disclose a
known lien, adverse claim or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of property
which he transfers or encumbers in consideration for the property obtained, whether
such impediment... is or is not a matter of official record." (emphasis added)). But
see Criner v. State, 109 So. 417 (Fla. 1926) (asserting, in reversing the conviction of
defendants for defrauding by false pretenses, that "[t]itles are matters of public record
and possession.... and the prospective purchaser may usually protect himself by...
an investigation [of the records]"). It is interesting that Criner nowhere mentions
Smith, a case decided by the same court just three years earlier.
49 See generally Arthur R. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967
(1953) (describing at length and condemning the longstanding legal "dogma" requir-
ing that the crime of false promises concern misrepresentations of presently existing
facts rather than future matters, including intentions about the future).
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make mortgage payments, is a lapse occurring somewhere later in the
relationship, and is less blameworthy in the eyes of the law.
What makes people believe that bigamists are eligible marriage candi-
dates? The bigamist seems primarily to manipulate the victim's trust in
those reassurances that are most difficult to monitor, namely the pur-
ported first-party constraints of the bigamist's love, loyalty, and fidelity.
Because these constraints are difficult to monitor, however, the object of
the bigamist's self-reported love and loyalty might be expected to greet
the bigamist's assertions with skepticism.
On the other hand, there are several reasons why the bigamist's profes-
sions may be particularly unlikely to receive close scrutiny. First, in the
intimate circumstances of courtship, it could be extremely disruptive to
inquire closely into the suitor's past love life, or to insist on ironclad reas-
surances that the suitor is eligible. This type of detailed inquiry invites
hurt and huff, and perhaps departure. Further, the bigamist's stories are
typically flattering to the victim, making them easy to believe. As Arthur
Leff points out, con artists are very much aided by victims' unwillingness
to believe themselves gullible.50 Finally, the bigamist's major story-that
he or she is unmarried-fits well into a victim's ordinary expectations.
This last point is due in no small measure to the fact that it is quite
difficult to bring off a deceit of this sort, especially when the bigamist
maintains two (or more) marriages simultaneously. Mere affairs are
tricky enough to conduct, but in those cases, the "outside" man or woman
is likely to know about the ruse, and may cut the adulterer a bit of slack,
even if grudgingly."' Bigamy, however, must be concealed from both
betrayed spouses, which undoubtedly increases the complications. One
has to wonder how a recent bigamist-a college student who had one
wife in his hometown of Manhattan, Kansas, and a second on campus in
Wichita-managed his life.5" Although this bigamist had an excuse for
travel, his finesse still seems quite remarkable.
Most bigamies appear to be considerably less spectacular, however;
they are simply sequential relationships where the bigamist has parted
50 ARTHUR A. LEFF, SWINDLING AND SELLING 84-87 (1976) (describing the diffi-
culty "marks" have in believing they could be fooled, and likening the phenomenon
to "cognitive dissonance" in psychology and "sunk costs" in economics). In a related
vein, some psychologists report a "confirmation bias" in their experiments: Subjects
who form an opinion appear to search data for confirmation rather than challenge.
See David Good, Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST, supra note
1, at 31, 42-43.
51 But see IRMA THOMAS, You Can Have My Husband (But Please Don't Mess
With My Man), on SIMPLY THE BEST: LIVE! (Rounder Records 1991).
52 See State v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1344, 1345 (Kan. 1986) (upholding the convic-
tion of the bigamist, who lived with his first wife and two children on weekends and
holidays and his second wife during the week). It took 10 months for the second wife
to discover the first one. Id.
1995]
HeinOnline -- 75 B.U. L. Rev. 545 1995
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:531
from an earlier spouse, and remarries without bothering to divorce. The
second spouse, and possibly even the bigamist, may believe the bigamist
to be widowed or divorced."3 Here the victim's trust may be no more
than a variant on Elster's magic-if I behave properly, so will he or she-
and on the Humean fallacy that this marriage candidate is like most can-
didates because the future is like the past.54 In such cases, of course, this
past turns out not to be like those other pasts.
In general, the law against bigamy appears to be a legal rescue opera-
tion that is aimed particularly at betrayals of the first-party reassurances
of character. Because bigamy can have quite serious consequences for
the betrayed, it especially undermines ordinary trust in first-party reas-
surances. Thus, the law bites harder on bigamy, by imposing criminal
penalties, than it does on adultery, where the victim generally has only
civil remedies.
It is especially interesting that the law's role here is not so much one of
a formal third-party substitute for first-party trust as it is one of a rein-
forcer of first-party trust through punishment of extraordinary betrayals.
To some degree, the legal constraints should cabin the worry and alarm of
potential victims, who are enmeshed in circumstances that severely
weaken their motivations to pry into the bigamist's own professions of
character. The law lets people go ahead and get married without engag-
ing in some of the monitoring and double-checking that rationality might
demand.
Does the law for that reason encourage sloth? Is this why we see
rather a lot of careless bigamies of the sequential sort? Perhaps so: At
least in part because of the legal restraints on bigamy, this behavior lies
far outside people's usual expectations, and hence outside ordinary suspi-
cions. This suggests the danger that legal reinforcements may reduce
monitoring, a subject to which I will return later.
B. Confidence Games: The Betrayal of Trust in Deals
For the next example, I turn to betrayals of second-party trust, the
semi-rational trust that is based on a the possibility of retaliation. One
might think that here the law has a lesser role to play as a reinforcer. If a
victim of betrayal can retaliate, outside reassurances are not necessary.
Trust here seems rational and warranted, so who needs the law?
Alas, as it turns out, quite a lot of people do. Consider one of my
favorite frauds, the pigeon drop, a very interesting and very durable little
crime. A venerable treatise on crimes gives several classic cases that date
back to at least the 1780s,11 but a new version, called "Spanish Lotto,"
53 See, e.g. People v. Vogel, 299 P.2d 850, 855-56 (Cal. 1956) (reversing a bigamy
conviction to allow the alleged bigamist to present evidence of his good-faith belief
that his wife had divorced him while he was serving in the miliary overseas).
54 See supra notes 36, 39, and accompanying text (discussing Elster and Hume).
55 J. W. CECIL TURNER, 2 RUSSELL ON CRIME 931-33 (12th ed. 1964) (citing Eng-
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has hit the streets of New York in recent years.56 In one year, Spanish
Lotto bilked unsuspecting victims of over two million dollars.57
What happens in the pigeon drop? In one possible version, the victim,
known as the "mark," finds a ring, a briefcase full of bearer bonds, or
some other "valuable" on the street. Just as this happens, Con A appears
and seems to make the same discovery. The mark and Con A discuss the
matter, and decide they should cash in. But can they really do so? And
how? As they talk, a well-dressed Con B appears and behaves as if she is
appropriately impressed by the "valuable." She claims to be a lawyer,
and assures them that they can indeed cash in on the found object. More-
over, Con B knows a dealer who can take it, and after some discussion,
she telephones this person, who is likely to be Con C. The "dealer," how-
ever, will only take the "valuable" from reputable persons, and insists
that each be able to show their worth by displaying a rather large amount
of cash.
Cons A and B are more than willing to go to their banks, and they
return with the required sum. They then propose that the mark get cash
from the mark's savings account.58 After some hesitation, the mark does
so and returns with the money. Con B must now go to see the "dealer,"
taking everyone's cash with her. To reassure the mark, the "valuable" is
left with him and Con A. They retire to a pub for a beer, to await Con
B's call. Con A excuses himself and goes to the bathroom; after a lengthy
wait for Con A's return, the mark finally checks the bathroom and finds
that Con A is long gone. The mark then has the alleged valuable
appraised: worthless, of course. The mark is now left to contemplate his
severely depleted bank account.
What has happened here? Con A and B have used a number of
lish cases illustrative of fraud through "ring dropping" and "purse dropping," schemes
in which one person obtains money from a second on the pretext that the money
secures the second person's interest in an allegedly valuable object "found" on the
street); see, e.g., R. v. Watson, 168 Eng. Rep. 422 (P.C. 1794) (convicting the defend-
ant of felony larceny for engaging in ring dropping); R. v. Moore, 168 Eng. Rep. 260
(P.C. 1784) (holding that obtaining money by ring dropping is a felony); R. v. Patch,
168 Eng. Rep. 221 (P.C. 1782) (holding that obtaining property from another by ring
dropping is a felony if accomplished pursuant to a preconceived scheme to steal).
56 John Tiemey, In This Lotto, All They Need Is a Dollar and a Dupe, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1991, at Al (reporting that the operators and victims of this scam, involving
altered Lotto tickets, are nearly always Hispanic). Tierney describes Spanish Lotto as
a derivation of two other con games, the handkerchief switch and the pigeon drop.
Id. at B4; see also Fred R. Bleakley, Posing as Bankers and Police, Con Artists Prey on
the Elderly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1994, at B1 (describing the "bank examiner" con
game as another version of the pigeon drop, an "age-old scam").
57 Tierney, supra note 56, at B4 (reporting total losses for 1990).
58 This is known in the con game trade as putting the mark "on the send." See
generally LEFF, supra note 50, at 52 (explaining that a major difference between big
cons and little cons is that big cons typically involve putting the mark on the send).
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devices to get the mark's trust, amply illustrating Arthur Leff's argument
that the swindle is a kind of drama, replete with props and supporting
characters, in which the victim is unknowingly cast.59 First, they have
effectively simulated coincidence-the chance find of the jewel, the
chance simultaneous appearance of Con A, the chance later appearance
of Con B, a possible confirming telephone voice from Con C. The mark
believes that such a string of circumstances must be add up to the truth,
because each independently corroborates the others. Moreover, Con A
and Con B have appeared to trust each other and to trust the mark as
well, by putting cash into the hands of the others. "If A is doing this," the
mark thinks, "why shouldn't I?" This ruse exploits two common features
of the con game: the mark's readiness to trust a partner who exposes
himself to risk,"0 and the mark's willingness to believe in what others
seem to believe.6
Most pertinent of all, the con artists have exploited a false assurance of
tit-for-tat: I'll take the money, but you keep the valuable. As Leff
remarked, the successful swindle never offers something for nothing; it is
always something for something.62 In short, this game not only takes the
victim's money, but does so in a way that undermines the victim's ordi-
nary strategies for self-reassurance and semi-rational trust. The con game
59 Id. at 28-29 (analogizing a con game to a play); id. at 51 (pointing out the rele-
vance of theatrical terms in describing both swindling and selling). In describing the
con game as a drama, Leff anticipated Charles Sabel's observation that trust has a
narrative dimension: Trusting relationships occur where the participants reinterpret
their histories so as to resolve prior conflicts and make trust "the natural outcome of
common experiences." Sabel, supra note 16, at 226-28.
60 Robert Swinth suggests that one player's willingness to expose himself to risk
may signal or educate the other player that response in kind is safe. See Swinth, supra
note 4, at 337. Con artists often pretend to expose themselves to risk-for example,
by telling marks that they are involved in crimes or shady activities-in order to pro-
mote the marks' trust and draw them into complicity in these dealings. See LEFF,
supra note 50, at 30-33 (describing "Psst Buddy," a scam in which the con artist sells
purportedly stolen goods to the mark). Some pigeon drops may have such a shady
feature; for example, where the "found" objects in the pigeon drop appear to be sto-
len or contraband, or the law allegedly requires the "finders" to try to locate the true
owner. In these pigeon drops, the mark and the con become "partners" in what
seems to be sub-par behavior.
61 LEFF, supra note 50, at 81 (noting that the "mass mutual presence" of marks
validates each mark's participation in a scam, because each thinks that "[i]f all those
other people believe in something, it can't be a total twaddle").
62 Id. at 10-11 (stating that this practice is necessary to resolve the mark's ques-
tions as to why the con doesn't just keep the bounty for himself); id. at 115 (explain-
ing that the "chief dramaturgical problem of every [con] is writing and acting out a
convincing script in which the mark's gain is not the conman's loss, but rather is his
gain too").
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especially undermines the credibility of that central form of second-party
constraint, tit-for-tat.
Such swindles are deadly for the kind of trust that underlies business
relationships. Trust based on first-party assurance is a rather specialized
matter, and works primarily in friendships and family affairs, where the
parties often have long and intimate knowledge of one another's charac-
ter. But the second-party assurances of tit-for-tat open up the possibility
of trusting persons whom one does not know anywhere near so inti-
mately. For this reason, exchange and commerce are directly threatened
by dramas that make tit-for-tat seem unreliable.
This may explain why, in a modem commercial culture, scam-dramas
like the pigeon drop are crimes enforced by public authority, rather than
simply occasions for civil restitution. The reason the law treats these acts
as crimes is that they have wider ramifications than mere private matters
between con and mark. Criminalization of these con games aims not
only, or even primarily, at restoring the mark's money, but much more at
stopping such underminings of trust. These con games are akin to stock
market fraud and other more modem-day economic crimes, which argua-
bly undermine confidence in a wide range of commercial activities.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the pigeon drop and similar
scams have not always been crimes, and indeed were not crimes at com-
mon law. In a sense, the mark's acts could be characterized as voluntary
because no force is involved. Even if the mark is tricked, he willingly
hands over his cash. A judge of the King's Bench made just this point in
a 1704 case in which the defendant had gotten money by pretending to be
a legitimate messenger.6" The judge could not see why this kind of trick-
ery should be a crime, remarking rhetorically, "Shall we indict one man
for making a fool of another?"" Presumably the victim's remedy was a
civil action for restitution.65
Only later in the eighteenth century, as the English legal community
began to develop modem contract and commercial law, did new criminal
categories begin to address scams of this sort. The new measures
included a parliamentary statute punishing acquisitions by "false
pretenses, 66 and a judicial doctrine vilifying larceny by trick.67 These
criminalizations of con games suggest the tremendous importance of
63 R. v. Jones, 92 Eng. Rep. 174 (K.B. 1704).
64Id
65 See id. (stating that "[tihis is no crime, and [the victim] has remedy by action").
66 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24, sec. 1 (1757) (Eng.) (making it a crime knowingly to obtain
money or goods from another under false pretenses).
67 See R. v. Watson, 168 Eng. Rep. 422, 424 (P.C. 1794) (putting to the jury the
issue of whether the defendant's actions in ring-dropping constituted "an original pre-
concerted design to obtain this property by means of a fraudulent trick"); supra note
55 (listing English cases classifying ring dropping as a felony); cf R. v. Pear, 168 Eng.
Rep. 208, 208 (P.C. 1779) (ruling that a defendant who obtained a horse under false
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commerce in modem legal culture. Much commerce depends on the
trustworthiness of second-party constraints, and modem law reinforces
that trust by punishing the conscious undermining of those constraints.
C. Treason: The Betrayal of Institutional Trust
One can look upon treason as a betrayal of the kind of trust that is
based primarily on third-party constraints." Victim A mistakenly thinks
that the threats of a blackened reputation, ostracism from the group, and
criminal prosecution are sufficient to constrain B's behavior. Unfortu-
nately, they turn out not to be.
This section actually examines not the formal crime of treason, but
rather the somewhat more specialized betrayal known as citizen espio-
nage. Treason is extremely narrowly defined in the United States Consti-
tution, consisting only of insurrection and aiding the enemy in wartime.69
This is largely because the founders of our nation thought that their for-
mer British rulers had abused treason prosecution.7" However, there are
many other ways to betray one's country, and citizen espionage will suf-
fice for my purposes.
Recently there has been an extremely interesting and very damaging
case of espionage against the United States, by a so-called mole and self-
confessed spy in the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). Over a
number of years, this spy, a man named Aldrich Ames, betrayed the iden-
tity of a number of informants in the service of the United States, which
betrayals appear to have led to the capture and death of these persons.7'
Patriotism is supposed to deter people from spying on their country,
but in our own espionage agencies, professions of loyalty to one's country
are not enough; agents are supposedly under constant surveillance.72
pretenses and immediately sold it was guilty of a felony because the hiring was with
the intention to steal).
68 See Sarbin, supra note 11, at 121 (referring to spies as betrayers of trust).
69 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (defining treason to "consist only in levying War
against [the United States], or in adhering to [its] Enemies, giving them Aid and
Comfort").
70 NATHANIEL WEYL, TREASON: THE STORY OF DISLOYALTY AND BETRAYAL IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 4-9 (1950) (describing the history and definition of treason in
the Constitution, and comparing treason punishments in England and America). For
a more extensive history of treason in English and American colonial legal history,
see Ralph M. Carney, The Enemy Within: A Social History of Treason, in CITIZEN
ESPIONAGE, supra note 11, at 19, 24-36.
71 Tim Weiner, A Decade as a Turncoat: Aldrich Ames' Own Story, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1994, at Al (stating that these betrayals led to the loss of hundreds of classi-
fied reports and the execution by the Soviet Union of up to a dozen double agents).
72 In fact, however, surveillance may be limited once an agent is in place. See
Katharine Herbig, A History of Recent American Espionage, in CITIZEN ESPIONAGE,
supra note 11, at 39, 59-63. Herbig outlines several factors that since the 1950s have
impeded internal surveillance: over-reliance on entry-level screening, to the exclusion
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Somehow Ames slipped through. One possible explanation for this disas-
ter is that the CIA did not really pay attention to its own surveillance, but
instead mistakenly trusted Ames because of its implicit reliance on infor-
mal third-party constraints. Though something of a loner, Ames was an
insider. His father had been a CIA man,7" and Ames himself had worked
his whole life as a CIA spy. He reportedly drank too much and was
thought to be rather sloppy,7" but given the longevity of Ames's espio-
nage activities, there appear to have been other sloppy people in the
agency as well. In some larger sense, Ames was one of the guys.75 It
seems that at least in part because he was one of the guys, no one paid
much attention to Ames's drinking, his association with suspicious char-
acters, or the large amounts of money he seemed to have at his disposal,
all facts that were readily available to monitors.76
Ames's case is especially interesting in contrast to that of another CIA
agent who was not one of the guys, and who recently brought a sex dis-
crimination case against the agency. Janine Brookner was a rising star in
the CIA until she filed internal complaints concerning her colleagues'
misconduct.7 7 In response to her allegations, one of these co-workers
claimed, with what appears to be little or no evidence, that Brookner was
a "hard-drinking hussy."'78 To the surprise of many of Brookner's col-
leagues, the Agency believed the male co-workers and not her.79 Her suit
alleged that CIA higher-ups had also disbelieved her on another matter.
She allegedly ran across Aldrich Ames in New York in 1984, and
of further investigation; increasing concern in the executive and judicial branches over
individual privacy rights; cutbacks in congressional funding; diffusion of information
through outside contracting; and the multiplication of secret projects, with an accom-
panying increase in the number of persons with security clearances.
7a Weiner, supra note 71, at B10 (reporting that Ames's father had worked as a
CIA analyst).
74 See id (noting that Ames continued to receive promotions to sensitive positions
"despite his supervisors' knowledge of his heavy drinking, financial troubles, erratic
work and odd views").
75 See Tim Weiner, Report on C.LA. Spy Is Said to Show Agency's Blunders, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, at A28 (quoting an intelligence official as saying that the CIA
"is an agency where you just take care of each other").
76 See Weiner, supra note 71, at B10 (observing that Ames's reputation at the CIA
was that of "deadwood, drunkard, [and] dissident," and reporting Ames's admission
that he made no effort to conceal the large amounts of cash that he was receiving
from the Soviets).
77 Tim Weiner, C.LA. Colleagues Call Fallen Star a Bias Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
14, 1994, at Al (reporting that Brookner was a "terrific spy" who likely committed
"career suicide" by filing an internal complaint after being denied a post because her
future deputy refused to work for a woman).
78 Id (stating that Brookner's deputy station chief made these allegations in retali-
ation for Brookner's filing of a report that the deputy was beating his wife).
79 Id. at A15.
1995]
HeinOnline -- 75 B.U. L. Rev. 551 1995
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:531
reported that he was compromising secret operations by his loose talk
and his goings-on with a foreign girlfriend. This report got more or less
nowhere.80
The CIA's mistaken trust in Ames thus appears to have had a good
deal to do with his insider status, and with the mistaken belief that he
would never run the risk of ostracism, either from his country or, more
particularly, from the agency for which he had worked for so long. 8' The
same mistaken belief was applied to Kim Philby, a notorious British spy
of a slightly earlier vintage. As one commentator observed, Philby's aris-
tocratic colleagues in the British Secret Service "couldn't imagine that a
man from all the right schools and all the right clubs could betray his
blue-blood legacy."82
There could be another reason as well for the slackening of attention to
Ames. In some ways, Ames's betrayal was rather like the betrayals that
occur in the con games that Leff dubbed "public spectacles," enterprises
such as Ponzi schemes or real estate bubbles in swamplands in which the
con artist swindles large numbers of people.83 Among other things, as
Leff observed, these scams are advanced by the fact that the marks
depend on the supposed evaluations made by all the other marks: Each
victim thinks that the others must know what they are doing. "Surely,"
each thinks, "they can't all be as ignorant as I am.",
84
This pattern appears to be a flaw characteristic of trust based on infor-
mal third-party constraints, and perhaps of trust on formal third-party
constraints as well. The problem is an information variant on the collec-
tive action problem. One's reputation spreads among many diffuse per-
sons, all those C's through Z's. But who among the C's through Z's will
be responsible for monitoring the betrayer? Who should inquire whether
the betrayer truly cares about what C through Z think of him? It seems
reasonable to suppose that this collective action problem only worsens
with time, reflecting the more general entropy of semi-rational trust: the
tendency of those monitoring trust to slide into first-party assurances of
character, and then to give up on assurances altogether.
Perhaps the most important factor in the slackening of surveillance is a
point discussed earlier: Distrust can be disruptive to social groups. This is
80 Id (quoting one CIA agent who characterized the action taken against Ames as
a "light, light reprimand").
a See Weiner, supra note 71, at B10 (quoting CIA Director R. James Woolsey's
admission that the Ames case made the agency confront a culture of secrecy com-
bined with "a sense of trust and camaraderie within the fraternity that can smack of
elitism and arrogance" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
82 Ron Rosenbaum, Kim Philby and the Age of Paranoia, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 29, 31.
83 See generally LEFF, supra note 50, at 65-69 (describing the workings of such
scams in a chapter entitled "Public Spectacles").
84 Id at 80-81.
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well known in the sensitive world of intelligence-gathering, and is one
reason why enemies try to sow rumors of moles in each others' midst.
Ames's betrayals began sometime after the CIA had been overwhelmed
with rumors of moles, and after purges had so thoroughly sapped morale
that no one really wanted to launch another investigation. 5 Distrust had
seemed to weaken the agency, and as a consequence, no one wanted to
be too distrustful of Ames.
In a way, Ames's case was only a heightened instance of a certain kind
of institutional vulnerability; indeed, the disruptive nature of distrust is
the central feature of that vulnerability. Intelligence-gathering exempli-
fies a task in which the participants cannot easily assess one another's
work, and therefore must trust one another in carrying out delicate oper-
ations. Precisely because intensive double-checking disturbs this trust,
however, internal security generally does not rely on the impersonal
"external controls" of continuous formal surveillance. 6 Instead, internal
security in such organizations tends to depend on the personalized "inter-
nal controls" of social norms, camaraderie, and mutual respect and iden-
tification among co-workers.8 7 What follows from this dependency are
the standard features of organizations of this type: the emphasis on up-
front candidate-screening instead of downstream monitoring, the clubby
atmosphere, the willingness to overlook flaws in other members of the
"club,"88 and the wide-open opportunities for the defector like Ames,
who was quite capable of concocting stories to convince himself that his
betrayals were justifiable. 9
85 Weiner, supra note 71, at B10 (noting that the CIA's inability to monitor itself
was at least in part a reaction to the period between 1954 and 1974, during which the
agency ruined the carers and lives of many agents in a dead-end search for a high-
level Soviet mole); Weiner, supra note 75, at A28 (reporting that although the agency
knew as early at 1986 that there was a traitor within its ranks, incompetence and
indifference marred its investigation for the next seven years); see Carney, supra note
70, at 21 (remarking that vigilance "threatens the ecology of trust" and increases
"motivation to resist excessive oversight").
86 See James H. Morris & Dennis J. Moberg, Work Organizations as Contexts for
Trust and Betrayal, in CITIZEN ESPIONAGE, supra note 11, at 163, 166-70 (explaining
that jobs involving tasks that are ambiguous or dynamic, behavior that is difficult to
observe, and outcomes that are difficult to assess require reliance on personal trust
and do not lend themselves to formal external controls).
87 Id. at 172-73.
88 Id. at 172 (detailing the enhanced role of peer management and influence in
internal control systems).
89 See Weiner, supra note 71, at Al (relating Ames's belief that he was helping
world stability by "leveling the playing field" between a rising United States and a
declining Soviet Union); see also Sarbin, supra note 11, at 118-23 (discussing narra-
tives used by spies to justify or rationalize betrayals).
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IV. LAW AND TRUST
In the area of business ethics, some scholars have suggested that there
may be a cyclical pattern in which elevated ethical norms oil the wheels of
economic activity, but simultaneously create opportunities for cheaters
who free-ride on the trust created by higher standards. Conversely, peri-
ods of low ethical norms drive out all but the enterprises in which high
standards can be assured, thus making high standards appear to be more
attractive. 0 If those scholars are correct, then we should expect cycles of
trust and distrust in many more domains. The result of the entropy of
semi-rational trust is that monitoring dwindles, making swindling more
feasible and attractive. As swindling increases, though, monitoring and
double-checking may rebound. As Bernard Barber has observed, trust
and distrust are substitutes for each other, and just as unguarded trust
may replace monitoring, so monitoring may replace unguarded trust.9"
This brings me to reconsider the role of law. Law reaches many more
subjects than purposeful betrayal, of course, but in the cases I have
described of conscious and purposeful betrayal, I have been stressing the
role of law as a reinforcer of the trust assurances of character, retaliation,
and informal sanctions. Others have described legal remedies in a similar
way, as a kind of backstop for more informal grounds of trust, particu-
larly where informal assurances are difficult to establish. One well-
known example of this is the one-shot "market for lemons," where legally
enforceable warranties may help organize deals that otherwise would fail
for lack of consumer trust.9 2
I would like to stress an additional, more subtle aspect of the law's role
as a reinforcer of trust. The betrayal examples suggest that insofar as
legal remedies reinforce trust, they seem to work best when they work
countercyclically. That is, legal remedies can play a certain balancing act
with informal trust grounds by moderating cycles of trust and distrust that
would otherwise occur.93
90 Thomas H. Noe & Michael J. Rebello, The Dynamics of Business Ethics and
Economic Activity, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 531, 531 (1994) (remarking on the cross-disci-
plinary recognition of the countercyclical nature of business ethics).
91 BARBER, supra note 34, at 23 (asserting that trust and distrust "serve as func-
tional complements to maintain social order, promote effective social control, and
preserve solidarity and moral community").
92 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 499-500 (1970) (employing the used-car mar-
ket to give examples of institutions, such as warranties, that "arise to counteract the
effects of quality uncertainty").
93 See Noe & Rebello, supra note 90, at 544 (suggesting that the frequency of
economic crime or of legal actions for breach of fiduciary duty could serve as an
indicator of the level of business ethics). Presumably, such indices would be
countercyclical. One might also observe in this regard that the law is only countercyc-
lical insofar as the courts are relatively uncorrupted in periods of low business ethics.
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Legal remedies lend support to an upswing toward confidence and
trust, but they counterbalance overconfidence-with its concomitant
increase in sloth-in a persistent pattern: They rarely completely remove
the requirements of diligence. Even though Parliament criminalized theft
by "false pretenses" in its 1757 statute,94 courts found ways to disdain
complainants who might have avoided victimization through the exercise
of ordinary prudence.95 In modern real estate law, there has been a very
sharp move away from the doctrine of caveat emptor in sales of residen-
tial property, especially new homes, and a complementary move to
require sellers to disclose flaws in their property.96 Notwithstanding this
legal evolution, if you buy a house with a hole in the kitchen floor, you
are still unlikely to get a legal remedy for breach of a builder's implied
warranty of workmanship or a seller's duty to disclose, because you
should have seen the hole yourself.97 Even indulgent legal developments
will not allow one to neglect monitoring altogether.9 8
Perhaps an even more significant incentive to monitor is the very cost,
difficulty, and anxiety of pursuing legal remedies. Going to court is time-
consuming, exhausting, and risky, and even a winning complainant may
find that her remedies are imperfect or difficult to execute. The long and
slow-moving docket of our civil courts may be a source of much criticism,
94 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
95 E.g., R. v. Wheatly, 97 Eng. Rep. 746, 748 (P.C. 1761) (holding that a brewer
who sold only 16 gallons of ale instead of the promised 18 was subject only to a civil
action because the victim's injury arose from his "own negligence and carelessness" in
not measuring the amount of liquor). This comment is especially interesting coming
from Lord Mansfield, who pioneered much early commercial law. See also Pearce,
supra note 49, at 969-74 (documenting further instances of this judicial pattern in
England in the half-century after the statute's enactment). Pearce himself saw this
judicial pattern as an unduly narrow reading of the crime of false pretenses. Id. at
974-75 (decrying the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of the
meaning of "false pretence" in an 1837 case).
96 See, e.g., Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Ct. App. 1963) (recognizing the
settled principle that a seller has a duty to disclose defects materially affecting the
property's value that are known to the seller but not reasonably ascertainable by the
buyer); Caceci v. Di Canio Constr. Corp., 526 N.E.2d 266, 267-68 (N.Y. 1988) (hold-
ing that a builder-vendor makes an implied warranty of skillful construction, or habit-
ability, to a purchaser, and listing 25 other states so holding).
97 See, e.g., Lempke v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290, 297 (N.H. 1988) (extending the
builder-vendor's implied warranty of workmanship to subsequent purchasers, but lim-
iting it to latent defects that surface within a reasonable period of time); Kuczmanski
v. Gill, 302 S.E.2d 48 (Va. 1983) (applying the doctrine of caveat emptor to defects
easily discoverable by buyer).
98 For a related effort to require diligence, see Criner v. State, 109 So. 417 (Fla.
1926) (reversing a conviction for defrauding by false pretenses and declaring that pro-
spective purchasers of real estate can protect themselves by checking the public title
records).
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but there is a certain efficiency to the pattern: It induces people to look
out for themselves.
I mentioned earlier that the legal scholars of the Law and Society
movement generally argue that formal law is really rather marginal in
people's daily lives, including their business affairs, even though there is
in fact rather a lot of law on the books. These scholars argue that how-
ever extensive formal legal regulations may be, personal relations, infor-
mal sanctions, and group dynamics may do far more to govern people's
behavior.99 Yet, considering the role of trust in the light of betrayal, per-
haps it is important that the law not be too significant. It may in fact be
better that the law serve as a reinforcer of, rather than a substitute for,
the ways that people normally reassure themselves about the trustworthi-
ness of their partners. By its very slowness, clumsiness, and ineffective-
ness, the law remands the policing of trust to what are often much more
efficient fora: conscience, retaliation, and informal community norms.
At the same time, however, it is important that the law have some effi-
cacy. In situations in which reassurances of conscience, retaliation, or
community norms cannot easily take root, formal legal constraints can
allow some fruitful cooperation to occur. 100 Legal remedies no doubt
encourage some sloth, some entropy of semi-rational trust, and some
neglect of double-checking, even when prudence might dictate greater
watchfulness. Who really asks whether a marriage partner might be a
bigamist, given that bigamists go to jail? Why bother to check for embez-
zlers and industrial spies, when they too wind up in the slammer? It
seems only logical to suppose that the availability of legal sanctions leads
people to relax their guard, at least at the margin.
It is important to remember, though, that some sloth is a good thing,
because too many questions and too much suspicion may mean that the
wedding bells never ring, the deal never gets cut, the office morale suf-
fers, and the file cabinets overflow with monitoring evaluations. Just as
the law's clumsiness puts the brakes on the up-stroke of excessive trust-
ing, so the law's efficacy halts the down-stroke of excessive suspicion-
the suspicion that itself undermines trust.
I am of course describing what, it seems to me, legal remedies ought to
do. In fact, this legal balancing act is not really foreordained in any spe-
cific way. Perhaps human beings evolve toward some balance between
formal and informal trust grounds, but they must make many contingent
choices in the process, and different political communities make them dif-
ferently over time in a process notable for fits and starts. I have men-
tioned a few specific examples already: Adultery comes and goes as a
99 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
100 See Simon Deakin et al., 'Trust' or Law? Towards an Integrated Theory of Con-
tractual Relations Between Firms, 21 J.L. & Soc'y 329, 337 (1994) (describing contract
law as a "residual form of security" where other assurances fail or cannot be made
easily).
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matter of criminal law; different scams have received different levels of
public attention over time. 01 We face contingent choices in the larger
arena of economic ordering as well, but here, too, balance is elusive.
Socialist systems have been faulted for an intrusive reliance on formal
constraints, and for supplanting the more efficient private and informal
means of assuring trust,0 2 but capitalist systems have been faulted for
overconfidence in private ordering, to the neglect of the large and diffuse
resources that can be called the "public trust.'
' 03
In speaking of balance, I do not mean to suggest that trust in public
institutions and trust in private assurances are in some way alternatives.
If anything, the opposite is true: Private trustworthiness adds to public
trustworthiness, and vice versa. 04 What is most disruptive to an appro-
priate balance is corruption and weakness in government, where cheaters
can use payoffs or intimidation to avoid legal enforcement, where citizens
cannot trust the law anyway, and where citizens may come to distrust one
another as well, thus losing informal as well as formal grounds for
trust. 105
Corruption, of course, is a species of betrayal, sometimes undermining
all three grounds for trust. We may have trusted that President X was a
good ruler and a good person (character); that we could vote X out of
office if he failed us (retaliation); and that X would be constrained by
concern for reputation, or by law, or by the enforcement of other third
parties in surrounding institutions (punishment).0 6 Yet X may still
101 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (discussing adultery); notes 55-67
and accompanying text (addressing the "pigeon drop" and other scams).
102 See Ernest Gellner, Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order, in TRUST, supra note
1, at 142, 155 (recognizing in socialist societies the "systematic destruction of
subordinate units, of subunits within the society, other than those that are actually
part of the central machine").
1oa For one variant of this theme, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 484-85,
556-60 (1970) (arguing that some resources have a public nature and that courts
should restrain governmental actions giving undue weight to narrower private
interests).
104 See Hardin, supra note 15, at 523 (citing Thomas Hobbes in contending that
state sanctions work together with informal norms to enhance exchange and
interaction).
10" See Anthony Pagden, The Destruction of Trust and Its Economic Consequences
in the Case of Eighteenth-Century Naples, in TRUST, supra note 1, at 127, 137-39 (giv-
ing a fascinating account of two Neapolitan political writers who indicted Naples's
Spanish rulers for simultaneously undermining the political and commercial trust
among the citizens). For a modern example of this problem, see Celestine Bohlen,
After the Mafia, a Sort of Children's Crusade, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 10, 1995, at A4
(describing the undermining of civic pride and involvement during post-World War II
Mafia dominance in Palermo, Sicily).
106 Alexander Hamilton reviews all three of these trust grounds in THE FEDERAL-
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betray us, exploiting and undermining all three grounds for our trust.
Even at the level of governance, then, we once again find an image of
trust in the mirror of betrayal. This brings me back to the beginning point
of this lecture: In modem discussions of trust, it is vitally important to
address the construction or reconstruction of trust in political institu-
tions," 7 both locally and across boundaries. It may be that the only way
to approach this task is to start with small steps, which is why it is impor-
tant to consider how individuals take and receive assurances of trustwor-
thiness. When we start to think about small-scale trust, however, we find
deceivers and con artists who simulate trustworthiness. This does not
mean giving up on trust. Rather, we need to learn about trust from
betrayals and deceptions. By looking at trust in the mirror of betrayal,
we can see a reflection of the patterns, risks, and costs of establishing and
maintaining trust, upon which so many of our enterprises depend, from
the most personal to the most universal.
IST No. 72, in which he discusses the utility of the President's re-electability. He
argues that a President who seeks fame (third-party approval) will be encouraged to
undertake projects in the public interest by the prospect of re-election and time to
carry out the plans; a President who is merely venal, or one who is overly ambitious,
will be curbed by the prospect of not being re-elected (second-party retaliation); and
a President who has learned from experience or is simply an able person (first-party
character) can best serve the country if continued in office. THE FEDERALIST No. 72,
at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright, ed., 1966). Hamilton also
observes the need for monitoring: He rejects the division of presidential authority into
an executive council in part because such diffusions of responsibility tend to "conceal
faults." THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 455 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright,
ed., 1966).
107 See, e.g., Margaret Levi, Trust, Credibility and Consent 1-2 (Sept. 1994) (argu-
ing that democratic institutions can survive only with the "contingent consent" of citi-
zens, which in turn depends on citizen trust in government) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with Boston University Law Review).
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